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Summary
For more than 50 years, the United States has held a position of leadership in aircraft and aircraft component manufacturing. This economic sector has been a major contributor to the U.S. economy in terms of revenue and balance of trade, and has been a cornerstone of national security. The success of this sector can be attributed to strong local demand for air transportation during this period and to the continuous stream of innovations generated by the U.S. aeronautics R&D system. Today this leadership is being challenged by intense international competition in aircraft manufacturing. Also, a shift in the structure of the marketplace toward standardized products that are differentiated by cost has eroded the U.S. competitive advantage.
To remain competitive and be cost-effective, aircraft manufacturers have taken 
Importance of the Aviation Industry to the United States
The commercial aircraft industry has been one of the most consistently productive and sustainable U.S. industries in the latter part of the 20th century.
The sale of commercial aircraft generated revenues of $31 billion for the U.S.
economy in FY 2000 (AIA, 2000) . Sales of engines and other aircraft parts generated revenues of $15 billion. The export of commercial aircraft and the export of engines and aircraft parts generated $23.6 billion and $18.5 billion, respectively, making this sector the largest contributor of all U.S. industries to the positive balance of trade (AIA, 2000) .
The worldwide market for civil aircraft is expected to continue to provide demand for sales of commercial aircraft with forecast sales in excess of $810 billion over the period 1999 to 2008 (Anderson, 1999) . As of September 2000, the U.S. aircraft manufacturer of large transport aircraft had a backlog of 1,620 commercial transport aircraft orders.
In addition to the direct contribution to the economy, employment (456,000 employees), and the tax base, the aircraft industry provides several secondary benefits. The industry is a source of new technologies that are transferred to other sectors of the economy (e.g., gas turbines used for ship propulsion and emergency electrical generation and global positioning system navigation used in surveying and automobiles). The industry is also a critical component of the industrial and technology base for enhancing and maintaining national security (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) .
R&D Determines Leadership in the Aviation Industry
Leadership in the commercial aircraft industry has historically been determined by the well-timed introduction of new aircraft (and products) to meet airline needs (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) . A continuous stream of innovations, generated through research and development, is a critical element in attaining and sustaining this leadership (Phillips, 1971) . History demonstrates that government investment in research (military and commercial) and competition within the industry is essential to establishing competitive advantage (Lorell and Levaux, 1998; NSTC, 1999, p. 11) . The ability to rapidly change and refocus research directions is also critically important (Levine, 1963) . These concepts are illustrated in the pictogram in Figure 1 . Aeronautics leadership changes have occurred as a result of increased investment in aeronautics R&D and by focusing (and refocusing) aeronautics R&D to meet market demands. 1900 1910 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1940 1930 1920 United States (Heppenheimer, 1995 (Levine, 1963) .
Once again the United States was obliged to embark on a crash research program to overcome the deficit. This military-sponsored research sparked advances in the science of aerodynamics, propulsion (i.e., jet engines), structures and materials, manufacturing, and control. These innovations and the tremendous manufacturing infrastructure developed during the war made possible the "golden age" of intercontinental aviation.
The U.S. leadership in aviation has remained largely unchallenged until around 1980 when Airbus Industrie, a consortium of European manufacturers, successfully penetrated a niche segment of the aircraft marketplace with the A300, a wide-body short-haul aircraft. Airbus followed this achievement with the introduction of the advanced technology A320 series aircraft in the narrow-body short-haul market, and then the A330/A340 aircraft in the widebody, long-haul markets. Airbus's success, sponsored in large part by European governments, is fundamentally based on the utilization of advanced technology (e.g., fly-by-wire) made possible by a vibrant R&D system (Lynn, 1998; Heppenheimer, 1995) .
The dominance of U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers in this market has been eroded by this competition. In addition, during the last decade there have been significant changes in the structure of the marketplace and the way aircraft are designed and manufactured that have eroded advantages previously held by U.S.-based manufacturers. These changes are fundamentally altering the way R&D is performed. Without a vibrant R&D system for generating the kind of innovations that lead to long-term sustainable competitive advantage, the future leadership position of U.S.-based aircraft manufacturers and supply chain vendors is in jeopardy.
The Shift to Emphasis on Cost
The aviation marketplace has been characterized as "a sporty game" with low profit margins, staggering nonrecurring costs, and high risk (Newhouse, 1988) . For example, the cost of development of the proposed Airbus A380 is estimated to be $11.7 billion (Sparaco, 2000) .
Although the industry generates significant revenues, low profit margins-less than five percent-are the rule (Newhouse, 1988; Lynn, 1998) . For example, the price of a 100-seat aircraft has been held to 1989 levels or less, and greater than 50 percent price concessions are demanded on new engine sales (Stanley, 1999) .
Currently there are two remaining competitors: (1) Airbus Industrie and its European Union-based supply chain, and (2) Boeing and its global supply chain. Unlike other duopolies that hold market power, these two competitors face a number of forces that have conspired to create a very competitive, costsensitive marketplace (see Figure 2 ). Competition in each niche in the marketplace is fierce. Aircraft manufacturers are obliged to consider each sale a "must win," not only for the sake of revenue generated by the sale and market share, but for the sustained revenue from spares and maintenance over the life of the aircraft. Each successful sale also increases the probability of future sales to that airline by virtue of the economies of scale that the airline can achieve by operating a fleet of aircraft with the same (or similar) engines and other aircraft system components. As a result, the aircraft manufacturers follow the maxim of the industry, "don't abandon a market to the other guy," seeking creative ways to finance and serve each airline's needs at almost any cost.
The strong "buyer power" exhibited by the airlines compounds the sales pressure on cost. Although there are a large number of commercial airlines and aircraft leasing agencies, airlines do not operate as independent buyers.
Airline demand for equipment is heavily influenced by energy prices and economic growth. As a result, airlines' requirements tend to be quite similar in terms of what aircraft each one needs and when each needs them. These shifts in the demand for types and quantities of aircraft tend to be synchronized and effectively mimic the behavior of a single buyer.
A few large airlines are responsible for the majority of sales that set trends for the rest of the industry. In the U.S. domestic airline market, ten airlines accounted for 93 percent of revenue passenger miles in 1994 (Kaplan, 1995) .
Furthermore, there are only a dozen airlines that update their fleets with large enough quantities to support the launch of a new aircraft. 1 The trend of alliances among airlines has the effect of concentrating buyers into loosely formed buying cooperatives. In the very near future, global airline alliances could force aircraft manufacturers to sell to five potential customers-three alliances and two leasing companies-which will include over 80 percent of aircraft purchases (Stanley, 1999) . For example, 40 world airlines and aircraft leasing companies convened in November 1998 to petition Airbus and Boeing to build less-expensive "no-frills" aircraft. The objective was to provide for aircraft from both aircraft manufacturers that can be configured to suit each airline's needs. This aircraft could then be operated without retraining and recertification of personnel and could share spares and other equipment (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) .
Reducing Costs Through Outsourcing to the Supply Chain
These changes in the marketplace have spurred aircraft manufacturers to modify their operations with an emphasis toward reducing aircraft costs (Lorell et al., 2000) . In addition to performance specifications, aircraft manufacturers have now developed models of the cost share of each system, subsystem, and component (see Figure 3) . Under this "must-cost" design _________________ 1 As a rule of thumb, the launch of new aircraft requires commitments to purchase 60 aircraft.
Typically two or three airlines agree to purchase 20 or 30 aircraft each. paradigm, price targets are an explicit and fundamental element of the engineering decisionmaking. It is much more difficult to pass on incremental cost increases to the overall airframe, and ultimately, to the airlines. With cost targets for each component, manufactures have been able to better evaluate their ability to design and produce these components. In the majority of cases, the ability of supply chain vendors to produce a particular component at a reduced cost has led to the decision to outsource the component. For example, Boeing-historically a highly vertically integrated organization-now outsources, on average, 60 percent of the value of each airplane to vendors in the supply chain (Stowers, 1999) . The Boeing goal is to migrate to outsourcing 75 percent of the value of each airplane by 2016.
Aircraft manufacturers gain several cost advantages by outsourcing components (see Table 1 ). The primary cost advantage is the leverage of the economies of scale that a vendor, supplying other customers in the same market (and/or customers in similar, noncompeting markets), can generate.
For example, jet-engine manufacturers supply engines to commercial aircraft manufacturers as well as to military aircraft manufacturers. (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) . Outsourcing is also a critical element in the sale of aircraft, particularly to airlines with close ties to, or owned by, national governments. Boeing's foreign outsourcing is considered to be an integral part of its marketing 8 strategy (Lynn, 1998) . Countries that consistently purchase Boeing aircraft have historically also participated in the Boeing supply chain.
Policy Research Issues that Need to Be Addressed
Outsourcing of components in the commercial aircraft industry has delivered safe and reliable aircraft to the airlines at extremely competitive prices.
However, the increased role of the supply chain has resulted in a reformulation of the vertical value chain (i.e., the sequence of steps for the conversion of raw materials to integrated systems). This calls for a change in the way federal R&D funds are allocated and the roles and responsibilities for performing R&D.
Is Federal R&D Funding Supporting Supply Chain R&D?
The long-term sustainability of U.S. aircraft and component manufacturers It has long been an assumption that product innovations are only developed by manufacturers of the product. In a study of innovation in industry, von Hippel (1988) found that innovations in a product are generated by end users (e.g., airliners), manufacturers (e.g., aircraft manufacturers), and/or supply chain vendors (e.g., tire manufacturers). In some industries, innovative endusers develop innovative products and processes. In other fields, suppliers of related components and materials are the typical sources of innovation. In others, conventional wisdom holds, and the manufacturers are the typical innovators.
Von Hippel (1988) demonstrated that the origin of innovation is a function of the derived benefits to the organization, the organization's level of product know-how, and its ability to protect the innovation. End users of products have the most to gain from improvements in operational capability. When these users have the know-how to modify the product or use a product in a new way, they are most likely to innovate. By the nature of these innovations, end users are also in the best position to protect their innovation by using it as a trade secret and keeping it proprietary.
Manufacturers, those that supply end users, gain improved sales and market share from innovations in operational capability derived from improvements in product features and improvements in the implementation technology.
These innovations are the hardest to protect from imitation because, by definition, they are revealed to end users. Manufacturers are known to frequently ignore these innovations until there is broad demand across the marketplace or until competitive forces drive the change.
Supply chain vendors are also motivated to innovate in both operational capability and implementation technology to improve sales and reduce costs.
Like those of manufacturers, their innovations are difficult to protect from imitation.
The ratio in allocation of funding between aircraft manufacturer and supply chain vendor is not a simple decision. Because of the importance of the flow of operational requirements from the aircraft manufacturer down the supply chain, it is imperative that the manufacturer remain funded and active in performing research (e.g., identification of operational requirements). At the same time, cost pressures passed down the supply chain necessitate assurance that the supply chain is funded and performing R&D to use existing technologies to fulfill new operational requirements as well as to develop new technologies.
Determining the optimum ratio of funding between aircraft manufacturer and supply chain vendor is an area for future work.
Is the Supply Chain Adequately Represented in Federal R&D Decisionmaking?
Several studies have made recommendations for the creation of new government agencies, interagency committees, or industry-government consortia, and other organizations to oversee and coordinate research in industry (NRC, 1992 (NRC, , 1994 (NRC, , 1996 (NRC, , 1997 NSRC, 1995; Sarsfield, 1998) Determining the role and most efficient means of supply chain representation in federal R&D decisionmaking is an area for further research.
What Role Could Technology Roadmaps for Components Developed by the Supply Chain Have in Coordinating R&D?
To maintain a full spectrum of design, technical, and manufacturing activities, it is imperative for all parties in the U.S. aircraft industry to work together. In policy terms this implies the need for a mechanism to build consensus and implement an ongoing strategy, as well as to remove unnecessary obstacles to cooperation that exist in the United States. Several industries have developed visions and technology roadmaps that have served to focus resources in the supply chain in meaningful ways, eliminate gaps in R&D in the supply chain, and create synergies among vendors (Semiconductor Industry Association, 1994; Kostoff and Schaller, 2000; Groenveld, 1997) .
Has the Full Potential of Information Technology Been Used to Facilitate Communication in Supply Chain R&D?
Several industries have demonstrated improvements in overall productivity through communication and information sharing using modern information technology (IT) and the web (Hassell, Bernstein, and Bower, 2000; Neu, Anderson, and Bikson, 1999) . This technology has the potential to improve The supply chain itself has undergone dramatic changes in the last decade, also affecting R&D. The increased financial commitment of supply chain vendors has required vendors to either "bulk up" through mergers or alliances, or to "niche." The bulk-up strategy has been widely adopted, resulting in a profusion of business partnerships of every sort, from simple risk-sharing arrangements, to full joint ventures, to outright mergers. This has resulted in an extensive consolidation of the U.S. commercial aircraft industry supply chain (Velocci, 1999e; Scott, 2001 ). For example, aircraft manufacturers anticipate that the number of suppliers for a given aircraft will decrease from more than 3,000 to approximately 500 (Velocci, 1999f) . As described above, federal R&D spending has had limited effects on R&D in the supply chain. However, there appears to be significant potential in coordinating R&D and communicating requirements throughout the supply chain.
To mitigate the effects of industry consolidation and long industry cycles and to compensate for development cost sharing and reduced profit margins, supply chain vendors have had to leverage their knowledge and technologies to seek other sources of revenue. One of the most successful strategies adopted by vendors is to enter in "cradle-to-grave" relationships directly with manufacturers and airlines by offering after-sales support. Maintenance and repair operations generally provide high profit margins. In some cases, suppliers have packaged their products and after-sales support with a fixed fee based on the number of hours flown. For example, engine manufacturers offer "power-by-the-hour" and "fly-by-the-hour" contracts for engines and other systems (Schneider, 1998) .
This shift from product to service as a source of revenue has had a positive effect on R&D. Fixed-price contracts and after-sales service have provided the incentive for suppliers to improve the reliability and designs to reduce lifecycle costs and cost of warrantees. This trend, however, was not forecast by federal R&D funding agencies and has not been supported in a broad manner by basic research.
The future structure of the supply chain is an important element in the decisionmaking process of federal agencies sponsoring aeronautics R&D.
Trends in the supply chain and their effects on R&D should be studied further.
Conclusions
The importance of the aircraft industry to the U.S. economy and to national security demands an active role by the government to ensure the vitality of R&D in the industry. Federally funded, high-risk, capital-intensive R&D is critical to ensure the flow of innovation that provides the basis for sustainable competitive advantage for U.S. vendors. The modern industry structure of aeronautics places a significant element of the vitality of the R&D enterprise with supply chain vendors.
This issue paper has raised several questions about how the supply chain has affected the manufacture of commercial aircraft:
• Are R&D funds allocated to the supply chain proportional to the volume of R&D now performed by the vendors?
• Are supply chain vendors sufficiently integrated into the federal R&D decisionmaking and planning process?
• Is there sufficient coordination and communication throughout the tiers of the supply chain to maximize the efficiency of the supply chain without losing R&D capability? Do the mechanisms for communication and coordination (e.g., technology roadmaps, information technology, and proprietary data mechanisms) exist to ensure the vitality of R&D in the fragmented vertical value chain?
• Is R&D planning taking into account the likely structure of the supply chain in the future?
Failure to adjust the R&D system to reflect the role of the aircraft supply chain can potentially affect the competitive position of the U.S. aeronautics industry.
It could also result in the failure to develop new technologies for the next generation of aircraft. In addition, the consequences of inaction will not be limited to the aircraft industry, having possible consequences for other industries and national security.
Most actions necessary to maintain U.S. leadership in the aircraft industry are the responsibility of the U.S. aircraft industry itself, including aircraft manufacturers and supply chain vendors. However, the U.S. government also needs to create a favorable environment for these actions and to play a
